Resilience to Disinformation at the Regional Level in Georgia

The 2023 Index serves as a valuable resource for various stakeholders, offering them information about the factors, which according to local experts, affect the resilience of Georgian regions against disinformation. The index focuses on the four main categories: resilience of local authorities, resilience of political parties and politicians, resilience of the information environment, and societal resilience. These categories are considered relevant in measuring each region's ability to tackle disinformation. Within each category, various indicators are included to assess the level of resilience.

The index assesses the 11 regions of Georgia on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents the highest vulnerability to disinformation and 100 represents the highest resilience. All regions were found to fall within the range of 42 to 54 points, indicating that the level of resilience to disinformation is equally problematic and is close to the average.

In-depth interviews conducted with experts revealed that their views on the challenges posed by disinformation do not significantly differ across regions. However, certain contextual differences might exist, which means that the specific circumstances and dynamics of each region could influence their resilience to disinformation.

Main findings

According to the assessment of the 11 regions of Georgia, the regions can be divided into three clusters. The first cluster, with scores ranging from 42 to 45, includes Tbilisi, Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, and Adjara. The second cluster, with scores ranging from 46 to 50, includes Kvemo Kartli, Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti, Shida Kartli, Imereti, and Kvemo Kartli. The third cluster, with scores ranging from 51 to 54, includes Samtskhe-Javakheti, Guria, and Kakheti. The Kakheti region received the highest score, while the capital, Tbilisi, received the lowest score. 

Experts assessed the regions based on the four categories mentioned above. Among these categories, the resilience of local authorities received the lowest scores compared to the three other categories across all the regions. 
• Resilience of local authorities towards disinformation received the lowest score in Tbilisi (28%), Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti (29%), Kvemo Kartli (29%) and Adjara (29%), and the highest score in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region (40%).

• Resilience of political parties and politicians received the lowest score in Tbilisi (34%), and the highest score in Kakheti (74%).

• Resilience of information environment receive the lowest score in Mtskheta-Mtianeti (31%) and Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti (43%), and the highest score in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region (58%).

• The score for the resilience at the societal level was lowest in the Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti regions (39%), followed by Mtskheta-Mtianeti (53%), Kvemo Kartli (53%) and Shida Kartli (53%), and highest in Guria (66%), as well as in Imereti (64%), Tbilisi (63%) and Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti (62%).
Resilience of local authorities

The experts participating in the study unanimously highlighted the lack of independence of local self-governments, indicating a strong influence of the central government on local self-governments in all regions. This hinders their ability to address local challenges in line with their mandate. The local self-government bodies of the Tbilisi Municipality were assessed particularly negatively compared to other regions. 

Transparency of local governments was also emphasized as a significant issue by the experts and an obstacle to building resilience against disinformation. They noted that the low level of transparency leads to limited awareness among the public, non-governmental sector, and media regarding the activities of local governments. In addition, experts mentioned that local authorities often display negative attitudes towards watchdog organizations and independent media, which leads to a lack of communication with them on ongoing events. While some municipalities may have slightly better transparency practices, the overall trend indicates a lack of transparency across all regions.

In terms of countering disinformation and increasing media literacy, with the exception of one case, none of the experts from the regions mentioned measures taken by local authorities. Additionally, experts from several regions highlighted that employees of local self-governments sometimes repost on their social media pages the content containing disinformation and discrediting narratives spread by the central government. 

Regarding the integration policies and actions of national and local authorities in regions densely populated by ethnic minorities (Kvemo Kartli, Samtskhe-Javakheti, and Kakheti), experts expressed their belief that these policies and actions are insufficient and ineffective. They suggested that the state lacks a proper vision on how to address the multiple challenges faced by these communities.

When assessing the resilience of political parties and politicians, experts noted that political activity is more vibrant in the capital than in the regions. They observed that the majority of political parties in the regions, particularly opposition parties, engage with their potential electorate during pre-election periods. As a result, the discussion of the needs of the local population and the issues that affect them is limited.

Experts highlighted that while party polarization is more acute at the level of central politics compared to the regional level, it affects regional politics and the activities of local politicians. The polarization hinders constructive dialogue and decision-making through consensus. For instance, one expert mentioned that the Imereti City Council often disregards the issues raised by the opposition faction. 

Discriminatory attitudes of the ruling party politicians towards the media and civil society organizations (CSOs) were mentioned by experts from almost all regions. While the ruling party is generally associated with the spread of disinformation, experts also mentioned that opposition parties also spread disinformation against their opponents, although less frequently. In some regions, the experts observed the spread of Kremlin disinformation by Conservative Movements/Alt-Info, but they concluded that this has little impact on the public opinion.

When evaluating the information environment, a significant difference is observed between the capital and the other regions. Tbilisi stands out with a high degree of media polarization, mainly due to the concentration of national broadcasters with political preferences in the capital. Experts note that while there are pro-government and pro-opposition media outlets in other regions, polarization is less pronounced. They emphasize that local media coverage in the regions is generally more balanced compared to the coverage in the central media. Independent media outlets play a crucial role in maintaining a healthy information environment, as highlighted by the majority of experts. Additionally, experts mention that the ownership of media outlets in the regions is transparent and known to the public.

Out of the 11 assessed regions, Mtskheta-Mtianeti does not have a local news media, and only a small part of the local population of the Dusheti municipality receives the information about the local affairs through one specialized television. Along with this, the population of the region also receives information from the newspapers financed from the municipality budgets. The situation is similar in the region of Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, where the main source of information on local news for the population, apart from the media financed from the local budget, is one independent online media outlet. In both regions the internet and social networks are also important sources of information on local affairs. 

Experts from Samtskhe-Javakheti gave a positive evaluation to the media environment in the region, praising the local media outlets for their diversity and balanced coverage. The journalists “...do not shy away from covering acute issues...,” they stressed. A similar assessment was made regarding the local media outlets of Kvemo Kartli and Guria.

The challenges faced by independent media, as highlighted by experts across all regions, include government pressure and financial sustainability. The closure of an independent online information portal in the Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti region in 2023 due to financial instability is expected to have a negative impact on the region's information environment, especially with regard to informing the population of the occupied territories of Abkhazia. Many local television channels also face financial constraints that limit their ability to produce daily news programs. The need to develop investigative journalism as an effective means to address disinformation was emphasized in the Kakheti region.

Experts from all regions recognize the contribution of civil society organizations in the development of the local population, protection of human rights, and the promotion of democratic values. They also note the existence of so-called "GONGO" organizations - non-governmental organizations influenced by the government that contribute to implementing official policies. In several regions experts highlight the contribution of fact-checkers in improving the information environment. 

One expert acknowledges the challenge of insufficient monitoring of local media outlets' performance and their content, which leads to the assessments being mainly based on personal observations and on the evaluation of professional circles. The need for more comprehensive study of local media is emphasized in almost all regions.

When assessing the population, experts highlight that the majority of Georgians express a desire to live in a democratic state and support the country's integration into the European Union. This sentiment was evidenced by the events of March 2023, during the mass protests against the adoption of the so-called “Russian law”. Experts believe that a significant portion of the population has the ability to make an informed choice during crucial moments. The factors contributing to this include the widespread use of the internet, technological capabilities of young people, their greater openness to innovations, and the experience of traveling and living in the Western countries. The experts assert that these factors play a positive role in shaping a pro-European orientation of the majority of the Georgian population.

However, experts also identify certain challenges faced by the locals, which might hinder a larger societal resilience. One such challenge is the low level of media literacy observed across all regions. In the regions densely populated by non-dominant ethnic communities, the limited knowledge of the state language presents an additional barrier, preventing some individuals from accessing verified and fact-based information about current social and political events in the country.

Experts note that discrediting campaigns directed against the media and non-governmental organizations by both central and local governments have had an impact on the attitudes of the citizens towards these organizations. Although the primary targets of these attacks have been critical national media outlets, the overall reputation of the media as an institution has been negatively affected in the eyes of the public.

In the Shida Kartli region, which borders the occupied Tskhinvali region, experts point out that the population's sense of insecurity towards Russia creates a fertile ground for the success of Kremlin disinformation. Experts attribute such perceptions of the public to the approaches of national and local authorities, which, experts believe, lack strategic vision and have limited communication with the local population on these matters. Furthermore, experts mention that in some cases, attitudes towards Russia, particularly in the regions densely populated with ethnic minorities, may be influenced by trade and economic dependency on Russia.

 

 

Disinformation is the biggest challenge for democracies. Disinformation refers to false, inaccurate or misleading information that has been developed and disseminated intentionally to harm the public or to gain financial gain.[1]  Disinformation undermines democracy in many different ways; It can erode public confidence and trust in democratic institutions and processes, negatively impact a country's domestic politics and electoral system, harm public health, national security, and human rights.[2]  

With the widespread use of the Internet and social media, people have simultaneously become producers, distributors, consumers, and sources of information. Today, it can be said that a significant part of the population of Georgia receives information on current affairs through the Internet and social networks.[3]  Consequently, in today's information-abundant world, citizens need to be equipped with the technical and cognitive knowledge and skills to critically analyze diverse and complex information environments and make informed decisions.

Various sources indicate that Russia is at the forefront when it comes to the dissemination of disinformation on social media.[4] The Russian government employs disinformation campaigns with the aim of sowing uncertainty within societies, ultimately seeking to garner support for Russia.[5] These actions can have detrimental effects on democratic states, particularly impacting new democracies in the post-Soviet region that share historical and socio-economic ties with Russia. The consequences of Russia's hybrid war with Georgia have become increasingly evident in recent years.[6] Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent launch of new waves of disinformation campaigns, Georgia has faced even greater challenges. Furthermore, in the same year, Georgia's application for the EU membership candidacy further exacerbated existing political and public polarization, providing impetus for the authorities to share new disinformation narratives.[7] In recent years, disinformation related to gender and LGBTQI identities, both in traditional and social media, has been frequently associated with the ruling party, alongside foreign information interventions. Journalists, activists, and political opponents have often been the targets of such actions.[8]

When evaluating the state measures against disinformation, experts and researchers point out that the process is not largely inefficient. Despite the fact that three offices have been created in various state structures to work on disinformation and cyber security, the analysis of the current challenge faced by the country, inter-agency coordination and the effectiveness of specific actions remain problematic.[9]  The government has not updated its strategic communication document pertaining to Georgia's accession to EU and NATO, as well as the National Security Concept and Georgia's Threat Assessment Document.[10]  

According to various reports, the measures taken by the state in relation to the improvement of the media literacy of the society are insufficient and ineffective.[11] One of the platforms of the Media Academy, established by the Communications Commission, a body responsible for the development and implementation of the media literacy policy in the country, Mediacritic, which aims to “analyze and evaluate media products in order to improve the quality of the media,”[12] is considered by various experts, international organizations and researchers as a tool directed against those media outlets that are critical of the government. The activities carried out by the non-governmental sector towards increasing the media literacy of the society have been positively evaluated.[13]  

Various studies conducted in Georgia at different times have revealed the presence of ultra-conservative views among a segment of the population. Experts argue that these viewpoints can create fertile ground for the dissemination of the Kremlin's political agenda.[14] Furthermore, it has been observed that certain Georgian media outlets exhibit anti-Western, anti-American, and pro-Russian rhetoric.[15] Little is known about the level of media literacy of the society. According to one international assessment, Georgia ranks the lowest, 41st place, among the European countries.[16]

Considering the aforementioned factors, as well as the closer proximity of local self-governments to the population of the regions compared to the central government, which enables them to have a greater influence, it became necessary to assess the readiness of each region in Georgia to address modern disinformation threats. In order to accomplish this objective, the Center for Media, Information, and Social Research has developed an index to evaluate the resilience of Georgian regions against disinformation. This index is based on expert surveys. Each region was assessed according to the following four categories:

In the following chapters, you will find detailed information about the research methodology used to develop the Index of Resilience to Disinformation at the regional level in Georgia. This includes the conceptual framework that served as the foundation for the index, the description of the Delphi method employed in the research, the analytical framework, and the formula used to calculate the index scores. Next, the results section provides scores for each region of Georgia based on their resilience to disinformation. These scores will be accompanied by summaries of qualitative interviews conducted with experts.

[1] Carme Colomina, Héctor Sánchez Margalef, & Richard Youngs The impact of disinformation on democratic
processes and human rights in the world, European Parliament, 2021,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf
Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research
and policy making, Council of Europe report DGI(2017)09, 2017. https://edoc.coe.int/en/media/7495-information-
disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research-and-policy-making.htm
[2] Umek, U. Council of Europe’s response to disinformation. Council of Europe, 2021,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/3/487525.pdf
[3] CRRC. კავკასიის ბარომეტრი 2021 საქართველო. https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2021ge/INFSOU1/
[4] Alexa Lardieri, Russia Still Largest Driver of Disinformation on Social Media, Facebook Report Finds. US.News, 2021,
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-05-26/russia-still-largest-driver-of-disinformation-on-social-
media-facebook-report-finds?fbclid=IwAR0HjkPPmmi9VcieC2h_A9EZq5l9Yat0_q4YRW8L5wLfqrtHuj8Z2PfKFTY
[5] Disinformation and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Threats and governance responses, OECD, 2022,
https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/disinformation-and-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-37186bde/#figure-d1e539
Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter
Them. European Parliament, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653621/EXPO_
STU(2020)653621_EN.pdf
[6] Natia Seskuria, Russia’s “Hybrid Aggression” against Georgia: The Use of Local and External Tools. Center for
Strategic & International Studies, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-hybrid-aggression-against-georgia-
use-local-and-external-tools
Niklas Nilsson, , Between Russia’s ‘Hybrid’ strategy and Western Ambiguity: Assessing Georgia’s Vulnerabilities.
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 34:1,50-68, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13518046.2021.1923992
[7] Natalia Sabanadze, The Geopolitics of EU Enlargement: The case of Georgia, Georgian Institute of Politics, 2022,
https://gip.ge/publication-post/the-geopolitics-of-eu-enlargement-the-case-of-georgia/
[8] Tamar Kintsurashvili, Tina Gogoladze, Anti-gender and Anti-LGBTQ Mobilization in Georgia, Media
Development Foundation, 2023, https://genderbarometer.ge/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GenderReport-GEO-web-1.pdf
[9] Salome Tshekladze, Disinformation spread in Georgia, state's approach and ways of fighting.
Transparency International Georgia, 2023, https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/a42mm-18pgcover_3.pdf
[10] Giorgi Bilanishvili, Security Review. Russian military aggression in Ukraine and Georgia National Security System, Georgian Strategy and International Relations Research Foundation, 2022, http://bitly.ws/DLbg
[11] Ekaterine Basilaia, Nino Danelia, Mapping and Needs Assessment of Media Literacy Practices in Georgia, Council of Europe , 2022, https://rm.coe.int/-en/1680a5789e 13 Media criticism. about us. https://mediacritic.ge/about
[12] Media criticism. about us. https://mediacritic.ge/about
[13] Ekaterine Basilaia, Nino Danelia, Mapping and Needs Assessment of Media Literacy Practices in Georgia, Council of Europe , 2022, https://rm.coe.int/-en/1680a5789e
[14] Liberal Academy Tbilisi and Institute of Social Research and Analysis, 2020,
https://ei-lat.ge/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/geo-1.pdf
[15] Threats of Russia's hard and soft power in Georgia, Samegrelo, European Initiative - Liberal Academy Tbilisi, 2020, https://ei-lat.ge/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/politikis- dokumenti.pdf
Iakob Lachashvili, Nika Mamuladze, Davit Naroushvili, Disinfometer, Paata Gafrindashvili, Mariam Tsitsikashvili ( Ed.) Georgian Reforms Association, 2021. https://grass.org.ge/uploads/other/2021-03-26/888.pdf
Giorgi Tskhadaia, Anti-Western Narrative of "Imedi", Mediachecker, 2022, https://www.mediachecker.ge/ka/mediaethika/92158-imedis-antidasavluri-narativi
[16] Marin Lessenski, How It Started, How It is Going: Media Literacy Index, Open Society Institute – Sofia, 2022,
https://osis.bg/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/HowItStarted_MediaLiteracyIndex2022_ENG_.pdf

Below are the categories and indicators that the given index is based on.

Resilience of local authorities - this category is based on the following four indicators (measured by eight statements):

Resilience of political parties and politicians - this category is based on the two indicators listed below (measured by five statements):

Resilience of information environment - this category is based on six indicators listed below (measured by 15 statements):

Societal resilience - this category is based on seven indicators (measured by 16 statements):